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Abstract
Economic conditions in Russia are having a drastic impact on higher education. 
Chelyabinsk Agricultural Engineering University is typical of many regional Russian universities in
transition.   While faculty have freedom to determine curriculum and degree requirements, their
teaching loads are excessive, requiring up to six courses per year.  The future of higher education
in the agricultural sciences is at risk in Russia and other independent states.The Russian Economic Crisis: Impact on Agriculture and Higher Education 
in the Chelyabinsk Oblast, Ural Region
Introduction
During the summer of 1998, the international media reported a myriad of economic
problems in Russia.  The ruble crashed, the International Monetary Fund withheld loans, and
President Yeltsin sacked and reshuffled his government several times.  Real income fell and
unemployment rose as unprofitable enterprises laid off their workers or closed altogether.  As
autumn approached, reports of poor harvests due to unfavorable weather conditions - drought in
the Volga Valley and the Urals - signaled the potential for food shortages during the long winter
(Interfax 1998).  Subsequently, the Russian government requested emergency food supplies from
the European Union and the United States (Holmes 1998, p. A4).  The severity of the economic
crisis impacted all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country.   
The public focus on conditions in the urban areas of Moscow and St. Petersburg obscures
the extent of the economic crisis on regions far from the center of power where conditions may be
even more difficult.  This article discusses the impact of the Russian economic crisis on
agriculture and higher education in Chelyabinsk Oblast (Province), an important industrial
complex in the Ural mountains, far from the urban centers of Western Russia. 
Chelyabinsk, the capital city of 1.2 million, is one of the 10 largest cities in Russia.  It is an
industrial city as is most of the Chelyabinsk Oblast.  Until the late 1980s, 80% of the city’s total
industry was directly or indirectly involved in the Soviet military complex.  The city was closed to
all foreigners.  The main products of the city are steel pipes, tractors, and machine tools.  The 
military-industrial complex created many environmental problems, including air and water2
pollution, water scarcity, and toxic wastes.  The Chelyabinsk region is now termed by some as
“the most contaminated spot on the planet” (Chelyabinsk, 1998).  The Russian economic crisis
and the high cost of cleanup inhibit a resolution of these environmental problems.
The Russian Economic and Agricultural Crisis
  There has been little or no improvement in the Russian economy since the beginning of
economic reforms.  Since 1990, the Russian Gross Domestic Product has declined by 40%
(Figure 1).  The share of agriculture in GDP also declined from 15.4% in 1990 to 6.5% in 1997
while the volume of agricultural production also declined (OECD, pp. 38-39; Kiselyov, 1998). 
Capital investments in agriculture dropped dramatically in the early 1990s and continue to fall. 
The share of capital investment in agriculture and the food production complex also fell from 28%
in 1990 to below 8% in 1997 (OEDC, p. 45).  In 1998, capital investments account for only 3%
of total investments (Figure 2).  The decline in agricultural capital directly impacts food
production and consumption (Semyonov, 1998).
In 1998, total Russian grain production was estimated at 47.3 million tons, down about
47% from the relatively good harvest of 1997 (Figure 3).  Early snowfall covered another
500,000-700,000 hectares of grain which was not harvested (Interfax, 1998).  In addition to
weather related problems, yields suffered from low levels of fertilizer application, poor quality
seed, and equipment shortages, problems that have plagued Russian agriculture since 1990.  
While total agricultural output on large scale farms fell, the importance of food produced on
household plots looms larger every year (OECD, p. 49) (Figure 4).  Over 90% of the potatoes
and 85% of the vegetables in Russia are grown on private household plots (Lindeman 1998). 3
The decline in production depends on the types of farms and on their organizational and
ownership structure.  Significant changes have occurred in large scale farms, the former collective
and state farms (kolkhoz and sovkhoz).  Farms are now in collective ownership of the workers but
the management and technologies remain the same as pre-1990.   The relative decline in prices of
agricultural commodities compared to the prices of agricultural inputs has impacted the
profitability of all agricultural enterprises.  In 1997, only 18% of the farms in Russia were
profitable (Kiselyov, 1998).  Between 1990 and 1996, the agriculture input/output price ratio
decreased about 5 times (OECD, pp. 46-47), more than in any other East European country
(Figure 5).   At the end of 1997, total debt on all farms exceed gross sales revenue on 20% of the
farms (Kiselyov, 1998).  In this situation, funds are not available to pay for machinery repairs,
depreciation or operating expenses, all contributing to late harvests and grain losses.  While farm
debts have been restructured with full payments expected by 2005 assuming improved economic
conditions (About Measures, 1998), there is no assurance that these objectives can be met at the
national or provincial level.   Drought and other weather related problems compound the economic
and agricultural situation, especially in the Volga Valley and the Ural Region where Chelyabinsk is
located.
Chelyabinsk Oblast
Chelyabinsk is located on the Eastern slope of the Ural Mountains, 55
0 north latitude,
about 100 miles north of the Kazakstan border.   The city first appeared as a military fortress in
1736, but according to archaeological investigations, settlements existed in this particular region4
centuries previously.  Chelyabinsk gained status as a city in 1781 and it became the capital of
Chelyabinsk Oblast in 1934. 
The climate of Chelyabinsk Oblast varies by region.  Average temperatures in January are
about  - 16
0C (3
0F), while summer temperatures in July + 16
0C (60
0F).  Crops include wheat, rye,
barley, potatoes and some other vegetables and fruits. The severe droughts occur every 10 to 12
years but every third year, rainfall is inadequate for good crop yields.   Farmers face uncertainty in
agricultural production.  In 1998, agricultural production in Chelyabinsk Oblast declined
dramatically from the previous year due mainly to an extensive drought. 
In the Chelyabinsk Oblast, private farms occupy about 7.7% of  the arable land, but their
total output is only about 2.4% of the province’s output.  Currently, household livestock account
for 50% of all meat and milk production in the Oblast.  Private farms account for only 1.2 and 2%,
respectively, of meat and milk production (Table 1).  The limited number of private farmers face
the same resource constraints as private households.   A small amount of land, a limited work
force, a  reliance on hand labor, and a lack of mechanization constrain on food production in
household garden and vegetable plots.
The reliability of these data is questionable because the statistical system in Russia is not as
efficient as in the U.S.  Moreover, private farms probably do not report their real production due
to their concern over income tax obligations. Russian tax laws do not stimulate productive
development and almost any amount of income may be taxed away.   Lindeman (1998) also argues
that exaggerated harvest losses may be used to secure state aid - a situation not unlike the U.S.
disaster relief program. 5
Table 1.  Agricultural Land Use and Farm Production, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Russia, 1997
Share in Total Oblast Production (%)
Large Scale Farms Household Plots Individual Farms
Land Use 83.8 8.5 7.7
Inventories:
     Cattle 53.0 44.9 2.1
     Pigs 51.8 44.9 3.3
     Sheep and Goats 28.5 68.1 3.4
Total Output 43.5 54.1 2.4
     Meat 42.5 56.3 1.2
     Milk 41.4 56.6 2.0
     Grain
a 90.5 0 9.5
     Potatoes
a 13.2 85.9 0.9
aShare of grain and potato production by categories of farms in 1998, respectively.
Source: Chelyabinskii Rabochii, November 5, 1998; A.A. Koptchenov, 1998.6
Higher Education in the Ural Region
Chelyabinsk is also the educational center of the South Urals. There are 16 state and 18
private universities here. The private universities are small; some of them are branches of larger
universities in Moscow or St. Petersburg.
All of the state universities in Chelyabinsk, as well as in the whole country, are under the
control of different ministries or even different levels of government. Most of them are responsible 
to a corresponding ministry of the Russian government, i.e., Ministry of Higher Education,
Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Ministry of Internal Affairs, or Ministry of Defense.
The Division of Higher Education, in the Department of Personnel Policy and Education of
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, manages all of the universities, colleges, academies, and
institutes for professional training.  All are relatively independent institutions, but they are
dependent on Moscow for financial support.  Since the financial support received by the
institutions of higher education is not sufficient for general operations, they have to generate
revenue by charging tuition, renting buildings, and providing contractual research.  Moreover,
many universities in Chelyabinsk Oblast have huge public utility debts.  The cost of electricity and
hot water for heating are a major expense for universities in this northern region of Russia.
Universities, academies and institutes belong to the same level of education - Higher
Education. The difference between them is in number of students and faculty, number of
specialties, presence of councils for theses defense and other academic criteria. Colleges
historically provide academic and professional education.  Institutes for professional training7
provide post graduate educational training and skills development for the alumni, and sometimes
for the university and college faculty.
The Ministry provides operating funds to the university according to the number of
students taught free of charge. This number of students is limited and no university has permission
to exceed this number.  However, universities can teach more students but the students have to pay
their own tuition. Diminishing federal support to agriculture means a proportional reduction of
federal transfers to agricultural universities.  State funds go through the Ministry of Agriculture,
which itself experiences a scarcity of operating funds.  On the other hand, research contracts are
almost absent.  Large scale farms do not have any money with which they could finance research
because they do not have adequate income for their own operations.  The same reason prevents
full tuition payments at agricultural universities because of low salaries in rural areas.  Tuition at
agricultural universities is always less than in other universities which are oriented to the urban
population.
There are 260,000 students in the Agricultural Higher Education System. About 62 percent
of them are full-time students.  In spite of the large number of students, only 3.7% of the  rural
population in Russia has a higher education degree.  The main reason for this scarcity of college
graduates in the countryside is that rural students do not want to return home after graduation and
prefer to stay in the cities.  Prior to 1991, students were often assigned a job on collective or state
farms.  Now that the average salary in agriculture is only a third of that in
industry, trained students want to remain in urban areas where their opportunities for employment
are better than in the countryside.8
Students have also shifted their educational  preferences since 1990. Traditionally there
were four main specialties (majors) in agricultural education: economics, engineering, plant and
animal science. After 1991, agricultural sciences became a very unpopular discipline.  In the last
few years, there has been a change in the students’ preferences; now economics and law are the
most popular disciplines among all students, not only agricultural ones.  Chelyabinsk University has
three to five applicants per opening available in the economics department and about two
applicants per opening in engineering.
Traditionally, all of the universities provide a five year curriculum.  Six years ago some of
the universities started to provide bachelor’s degrees.  Unfortunately, there is no demand for
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in Russia.  Almost all students want to complete one extra year of
study after their bachelor’s degree to get a specialist degree. 
In 1998, the first masters candidates graduated from Chelyabinsk University. They are the
first Masters in Agricultural Engineering in Russia. All of them will apply for the Candidate of
Science Degree and they will continue their education in Chelyabinsk.  To get their Candidate of
Science Degree, graduate students need to meet several criteria. They need to complete their
dissertation and pass through the defense procedure, pass several exams and have several
publications.   It is impossible to became a Candidate of Science without a university degree. 
The next level is the Doctor of Science. To receive the doctorate degree, a person needs to
advise at last one or more candidates, have more publications and complete the doctoral
dissertation. 9
Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University
Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University is the oldest university in
Chelyabinsk. It was founded in 1930 in response to the rapidly growing tractor manufacturing
industry.  Industry and agriculture needed to have managers at the plants and at large state farms
(sovkhoz) and machinery stations.  Chelyabinsk State is one of the three leading universities in
agricultural engineering in Russia.  It provided only engineering degrees until the 1980s. 
Chelyabinsk State is a relatively small university with a full-time enrollment of 2,500 students and
approximately 1,000 part-time students (Table 2).  Chelyabinsk State is still highly specialized and
engineers account more than 70% of all of the students.
There were no significant changes in enrollment during the last five years, but the number
of faculty dropped in 1998 due to Russian Federal Cabinet decrees to cut all professors’ salaries by
repealing the premium payments. The reduction in Ministry transfers (or subsidies) resulted in
several decisions.  The soviet (the Board of the Faculty) decided to dismiss several faculty
members instead of reducing overall salaries.  As a result, the remaining professors now have to
teach about 25% more credit hours than a year ago.  Professors find it difficult to teach as many as
20 to 25 students in the labs and up to 150 students in the lecture halls given their limited teaching
resources.
Students have to complete about 50 courses (270 credit hours in total), pass 31 exams and
50 zachets (pass/fail exercises), execute a dozen course projects and meet their practical work
requirements (Table 3).  They also have to defend their diploma work to complete their education 10
Table 2.  Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University, General Facts
Year of foundation of Chelyabinsk Institute of Mechanization and
Electrification of Agriculture (ChIMEA)
1930
Year of Reformation of ChIMEA into Chelyabinsk State
Agricultural Engineering University (ChSAEU)
1990












Councils for Defending Thesees 6
Source: Unpublished data, Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University, 1998.11
Table 3.  University Requirements, Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University
Title of course Semester/weeks per semester Total
 Hours
Auditorium




















General Social and Economics and Humanistic Courses
 1  Philosophy  4 180 80
 2  Foreign Language  2  3  3  2 340 175
 3  Kulturology  2 78 40
 4  History  3 70 45
 5  Physical Education  4  4  4  4   4  4  4  4 408
 6  Law    2  2 120 72
 7   Sociology  2 60 30
 8  Political Science  2 70 40
 9  Psychology  2 50 30
 Electives   4  2  3 324 145
Total  1700 657
 General Mathematics and Natural Science Courses
 1  Mathematics  6  4  2  2 500 240
 2  Computer Science  4  4 250 140
 3  Concept of MNS  4 150 60
 4  Ecology  2 100 40
 Electives   4 200 80
Total  1200 560
 General Agriculture and Economics Courses
 1  Economic Theory  3  2  4  2 360 185
 2  History of Econ.Con.  3 90 48
 3  History of Economics  2 90 40
 4  Statistics  5  4 260 128
 5  Accounting  4  4 220 112
 6   Finance, Credit, Mon.  4  4 200 112
 7  Management  5 100 60
Table 3.  (Con’t) 12
 8  Labor in Agriculture  4  4 200 112
 9  International Econ.  2  3 170 88
 10  Marketing  3  4 150 88
 11  Plant Science  4 100 60
 12  Food Processing  4 120 60
 13  Crop Production Tech  5 190 100
 14  Animal Science  5 190 100
 15  Ag. Mechanization  3 100 45
 16  Ag. Electrification  3 100 60
 17  Resource Allocation  3 70 45
 18  Safety  3 90 48
 Electives   4  4  4 300 160
Total  3100 1651
 Special Courses
 1  Ag. Economics  4  4 130 112
 2  Organization of Farms  4  4 130 112
 3  Econ. Analyses  4 100 64
 4  Farm Management  3 80 48
 5  Entrepreneurship  4 70 40
 6  Planning Activities  4 90 64
 7  Soc.Econ.Pro.Model.  3  3 103 84
 8  Agricultural Markets  2 60 32
 9  International Ag.  3 45 36
 Electives   4  5 150 114
 Special Adv. Courses  3  4  8  13 13 800 534
Total  1758 1240
 Hours per week  29 27 27 27 26 27 27 27 27 26 8208 410813
Table 3.   (Con’t)
Grade System - Dual: Exams & Zachets (pass/fail exercises)
Average daily auditorium hours 6
# of exams 31
# of zachets 50
# of course works 6
# of course projects 5
Total practice work, weeks 40
Source: Unpublished information, Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University.14
and get their specialist degree. Usually the students have 6 to 8 hours of classes per day.  Usually
students exceed the limit of credit hours per week.  Now the system does not encourage students
to undertake additional self-study in the library or research topics independently because they need
to work outside of the university to supplement their stipend.
Some students at Russian universities do not need to pay for their tuition.  The obligation
to pay tuition depends on the student’s entrance exam grade.  If their grade is high, students can
study free of charge.  The number of students with “free” education has decreased year by year.  If
a student’s entrance exam score is less than a specific criteria, he/she can study for partial tuition,
and the last category is full tuition payment by the student with lower entrance scores.  Every
student can get the stipend if he/she has only A and B grades, but the amount of the stipend is not
sufficient to cover all educational and living expenses.  The real stipend amount is much less than
the legal one because the student’s stipend is a part of Ministry transfers and the university does
not have any resources to provide a larger stipend.
The amount of the legal stipend required by the government must be equal to double the
minimal wage amount, but in fact the stipend amount depends on the available university stipend
fund, which in turn depends, on the amount of state support to the university.  In October 1998 the
monthly stipend amount at the Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University was 85
rubles or less than $5, half the legal stipend amount.  There is very little opportunity for the student
to change his/her tuition status during his/her study at the university.  15
The students have to pay for university housing if they live on campus.  The cost varies
depending on the particular dormitory, but the average one costs 30 to 50 rubles a month per
student ($1.50 to $2.50).  Students also have to pay a library service fee of 85 rubles ($5) per year. 
The total payment for a student’s tuition exceeds the salary of professors at Chelyabinsk
University where faculty find it nearly impossible to provide an education for their children. The
monthly salary has decreased year by year.  In 1998, salaries are only about $76 for professors,
$51 for associate professor, and about $37 for assistant professors. This is the lowest level of
salary support since 1993 (Table 4).  Faculty salaries are subject to income, retirement and “social
security” taxes.   The income tax is 12% if faculty income does not exceed 20,000 rubles, $1,000
per year.  Most professors earn much less.  In addition, faculty contribute 1% of their income to a
retirement fund, making their gross income tax rate 13% of their monthly salary.  This is in
addition to what has already been paid by the employer.  In addition the university pays taxes,
accounting for approximately 42% of gross Ministry transfers prior to disbursing salaries to the
faculty (Table 5).  
Implications for Higher Education Russia
Since 1991, changes in Russian higher education can be characterized by a decrease in state
support for higher education, an increase in the number of universities and changes in their
structure.  Russian universities have more independence than during the Soviet period but much
less financial support.  Tuition payments have been introduced.  Stipends are provided but the
amount is very small.  Faculty salaries have also declined significantly.  The decline in state
financial support for the faculty has resulted in a shift from research to teaching with higher 16
Table 4. Monthly Salaries in U.S. Dollars at Chelyabinsk State 
                           Agricultural Engineering University 1993-1998
a
Date                         Faculty Rank                           
                          Associate                Assistant 
  Professor       Professor          Professor
December 1993 117.89 95.66 51.86
July 1994 153.68 113.81 44.93
May 1995 94.69 67.76 22.78
December 1995 184.87 136.05 52.05
May 1996 138.24 100.36 32.25
March 1997 162.65 117.86 42.15
July 1998 149.18 108.09 38.66
October 1998 76.56 51.63 37.35
aAll Salaries were converted from rubles to dollars at the official exchange rate.
Source: Chelyabinsk State Agricultural Engineering University.17
Table 5.  Tariffs, Taxes, and Deductions Paid on Gross Salary by the University 
Prior to Disbursement to the Faculty
Title of the Payment Percent of Gross Payroll
Retirement Fund Tariff 2.8
Social Insurance Fund Tariff 5.4
State Employment Fund 1.5
Medical Insurance Fund 3.6
Police and Public Transportation Local Tax 3
Total 41.5
Sources: Russian Federation and Chelyabinsk City Duma.18
teaching loads being the norm.  Faculty must also seek extra employment outside the university to
earn additional income.  In general, faculty have had a difficult transition to the market economy.
In addition to the increase in the number of branches of universities, changes in the structure of
universities have had a significant impact.  There has been an increase in the number of
departments, faculties, schools, colleges and institutes.  New academic majors have been
introduced such as the humanities, law, and economics and new degrees have been added to the
curriculum.  These changes and the economic crisis have had an impact on agricultural education.  
Government transfers of funds to the Ministry of Agriculture are often delayed which in
turn delays transfers of operating funds to the universities.  Large-scale farms cannot support
research contracts with the universities further reducing support for the agricultural sciences.  The
demand for managers on large-scale farms has fallen due to the financial crisis in agriculture. 
Moreover, students have no incentive to work on farms after graduation due to low salaries and a
shift in students’ academic preferences.  Education has become an expensive service for rural
people, resulting in a decline in the number of rural students.  Families have limited incomes and
tuition payments are an added burden which many cannot afford.
Conclusions
The chain of events that took place since the beginning of reforms contributed significantly
to the economic situation in Russia.  There are many reasons for this situation. First of all, there
was no real program for economic development in Russia at all.  No one knew the direction of the
economic policy, especially at the local level.  People did not know what was expected of them in
the new political and economic environment.  Goodhue, Rausser and Simon (1998) concluded that19
“a more vigorous privatization program increases both short-run price and production volatility as
well as the time it takes for this volatility to work its way out of the system” (p. 734).  Price and
production volatility in Russia diminished social welfare leading policy makers to restrain the
privatization process.  This may enhance social welfare in the short-run but continue resource
misallocation in the long-run.
The second reason is the willingness of the Russian government to reach the goals they
have never seen. That is why Russia had too many changes in national laws and no one could
predict what and when the next change would occur. If there is no economic and political stability,
no one can safely invest in his/her future. 
The third reason is the lack of trust in the government at the national level.  The
government does not appear concerned about the lack of trust in the system. The people do not
believe they can change their life regardless of how much they try.   There is a certain element of
hopelessness among a segment of the population.  
The fourth reason is crime.  An oligarchy effectively controls the economy resulting in
excess profits for a few and poverty for the majority.  But no one, even in the new Russian
government, wants to see this problem addressed to lessen its interference in the economic
development of the country.   The oligarchs provided the resources to elect the current
government.  Thus, politicians are reluctant to break up their monopolistic holdings and cartels. 
The fifth reason is the tax code and real execution of this code. No one is encouraged to
pay taxes because they are very high and discourage investment.  20
The sixth reason is the monopolistic input sector.  Energy - fuel, coal, and electricity - are
concentrated under state control.  This increases the cost of production in all sectors of the
economy and constrains development.   This applies to agriculture, higher education, and public
and private enterprises everywhere.
In Russia, higher education in the agricultural sciences will suffer severely from the
economic crisis.  Government revenues are lacking to support higher education.  Thus, the quality
and quantity of professional people in the agricultural sciences will decline at the same time that
farmers need new technology in production, processing, management, and marketing as well as
investment assistance.  Food shortages could become severe if the economic and educational crisis
continues.21
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